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Boeing 737 MAX is stupidly designed

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Boeing 737 MAX is stupidly designed

Old 03-20-2019, 06:58 AM
  #161  
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Originally Posted by The Revenge View Post


I was staying out of this. Your stretching things a bit.

I fly an Airbus currently, and have flown multiple Boeing’s, McDonnel Douglas, and Falcon acft.

If you turn the autopilot off in the Airbus, you fly it, just like anything else. Are the control surfaces operated by fly-by-wire?
You bet. So are fighters, SO ARE BOEINGS (777 and 787), so are Gulfstreams and Falcons. Fly-by-wire is nothing new.
Airbus has never lost an aircraft due to loss of flight controls.
Fly by wire is a very reliable system and design.




Only point I am making about the Airbus you don't have a cable going from your hand to the controls. You have a wire. I have mentioned the bigger Boeings were also not trying to hide that. Just made the point that the 737 to my knowledge is the biggest plane you actually can fly for real not by wire via a CPU.

So these people freaking out about what a computer does have no idea about the depth of what computers do on these planes and on an Airbus you are at it's mercy totally if it has a "glitch".

I ride on Airbus's all the time. Not scared...

Fly by wire is reliable.

We could debate the one going into the trees but I am out of energy on this haha.

Not an Airbus guy but something I read on the internet. Maybe not true.

"Even Sullenberger while gliding his A320 to a ditching didn't know that envelope protections would cut him out of the loop -- as far as pitch was concerned he was just a passenger for the last 150ft or so. Nothing like moving the sidestick and nothing happens. That could have been interesting but it all worked out ok. After that it was recommended that AB let the flight crews have a little more information about what was going on in the FBW system as will occur with this accident.

The philosophy for many, many years (30+) has been for manufacturers to not tell the pilots every little detail like in the old days. Among other things they don't want pilots adlibing -- Air Asia 8501. It remains to be seen if two or three sentences in the FCOM would have prevented this accident."

Last edited by ProppedUp; 03-20-2019 at 07:28 AM.
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Old 03-20-2019, 07:02 AM
  #162  
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Originally Posted by km1125 View Post
Did you watch the video?? Did you look at the CFR data?? The stick shaker was going off like crazy telling them the plane "thinks" it's in a stall.

The priority is to figure out why it thinks it's in a stall so you can maintain speed and level flight... which means turning off automatic systems and getting the plane into a wings-level and attitude-level situation with adequate speed.

Then there's the Air France crash we all remember where the lesson learned was to TRUST the aircraft when it tells you you're in a stall!
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Old 03-20-2019, 07:08 AM
  #163  
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Originally Posted by ProppedUp View Post
Page 1 is the page that list what Boeing feels are the most important emergencies that need to be dealt with immediately. Most all of these are "memory item checklists". Meaning you are supposed to have them committed to memory. Again out of hundreds of checklist these are the most important. Do you see "runaway stabilizer..... thats on page 9.1" on the list? Also a memory item checklist by the way? Yup.
That's an old checklist, and not a Max checklist. Boeing and the FAA no longer include Runaway Stabilizer as a memory item, (this will most likely change). Number one on the list of things to do in an emergency is "Maintain Aircraft Control" If you can't do that, you can forget about running a checklist. The mishap crews were too busy fighting the aircraft to run a checklist.

The 737 Max is certainly not "stupidly designed" It does appear that the effort to ensure the Max would not require additional simulator training or a new type rating led to some poor decisions by Boeing and the FAA during the aircraft certification.
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Old 03-20-2019, 07:12 AM
  #164  
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Latest I saw on the news is this happened on the Lion Aircraft that crashed the flight before. There was another captain in the jump seat being transported and he had to tell the two flying the plain how to correct the issue. It was reported to maintance and nothing was done and next flight it happened again and they ran out of time troubleshooting the system.

Below is a pretty interesting video I watched yesterday from a 737 trainer for BA. He went over stall recovery in a MAX and how to correct a MCAS error. After watching the video I am pretty convinced it was a poorly designed system lacking redundant sensors and a lack of training on what to do if the system fails.

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Old 03-20-2019, 07:15 AM
  #165  
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Just wondering with all of the talent and knowledge here why aren't we being call on to help with the R&D process to solve this problem?
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Old 03-20-2019, 07:22 AM
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Originally Posted by cdrhoek View Post
That's an old checklist, and not a Max checklist. Boeing and the FAA no longer include Runaway Stabilizer as a memory item, (this will most likely change). Number one on the list of things to do in an emergency is "Maintain Aircraft Control" If you can't do that, you can forget about running a checklist. The mishap crews were too busy fighting the aircraft to run a checklist.

The 737 Max is certainly not "stupidly designed" It does appear that the effort to ensure the Max would not require additional simulator training or a new type rating led to some poor decisions by Boeing and the FAA during the aircraft certification.
I pulled the QRH pics from the internet.

At my operation the captain would be flying and and say "runaway stabilizer" checklist to the copilot.

Not sure how you guys do it but at my company we don't let two people attempt to fly at the same time therefore one is freed up to read checklist and flip switches.
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Old 03-20-2019, 07:47 AM
  #167  
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Originally Posted by mikefloyd View Post
Just wondering with all of the talent and knowledge here why aren't we being call on to help with the R&D process to solve this problem?
I'm an aerospace engineer, commercial pilot, and before management I wrote aerodynamics and control law code for a major simulator company, to include some Boeing flight models. I'm not qualified to comment on this thread without knowing the specifics of the flight profiles as well as the software code. I doubt anybody here really is. I'm sure I could get a hold of some Boeing engineers pretty quickly, but they wouldn't be allowed to say anything.
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Old 03-20-2019, 07:50 AM
  #168  
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Originally Posted by Lorne Greene View Post
Latest I saw on the news is this happened on the Lion Aircraft that crashed the flight before. There was another captain in the jump seat being transported and he had to tell the two flying the plain how to correct the issue. It was reported to maintance and nothing was done and next flight it happened again and they ran out of time troubleshooting the system.

Below is a pretty interesting video I watched yesterday from a 737 trainer for BA. He went over stall recovery in a MAX and how to correct a MCAS error. After watching the video I am pretty convinced it was a poorly designed system lacking redundant sensors and a lack of training on what to do if the system fails.
Don't pilots also review the logs from the previous flights or maintenance actions before they take a particular plane on a flight?

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Old 03-20-2019, 07:54 AM
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Originally Posted by mikefloyd View Post
Just wondering with all of the talent and knowledge here why aren't we being call on to help with the R&D process to solve this problem?
No, they won't need to, for at least a while. They've probably already reviewed the threads and decided to completely scrap the MAX platforms as suggested by some here and start designing a new craft from a clean-sheet approach. After 5-7 years, they might come back on here to solicit input and review of this next airframe so they don't make any mistakes in design before they get into production.

[/sarc]
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Old 03-20-2019, 09:36 AM
  #170  
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The Internet is so cool. A bunch of regular guys can figure out exactly why a $125 million dollar airliner crashed just by using Google.

No fancy aeronautical engineering degrees or commercial pilot's licenses needed.
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Old 03-20-2019, 09:56 AM
  #171  
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Does any of this missive make sense to anyone here?

And Now, The WHY: An Educated Guess in [Market-Ticker]
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Old 03-20-2019, 09:59 AM
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Originally Posted by Seacat FL View Post
The Internet is so cool. A bunch of regular guys can figure out exactly why a $125 million dollar airliner crashed just by using Google.

No fancy aeronautical engineering degrees or commercial pilot's licenses needed.
And they fix boats with UTube also.
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Old 03-20-2019, 10:12 AM
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Look - People can say what they want but at the end of the day it's Boeing's fault. They either manufactured a plane with crappy flight systems, sensors, software etc... or they made the software and manuals too difficult for their customers to understand.

We often write simple software scripts at work. Before my team writes anything we meet with our intended users to understand their technical capabilities. If they just want to push a button that's what we do. If they want more flexibility we make sure they understand the logic behind the scrips and write simple manuals for them. We don't want them to bother us when it doesn't work. We want it to work for the customer.
I know this is an oversimplification. But it's Boeing fault either way, it's bad business to blame your customers. Don't give them that opportunity....
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Old 03-20-2019, 10:12 AM
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So, to summarize the current situation: Modern non US pilots will crash if they encounter a runaway trim condition for any reason.

Edit: IT luckily is a rare thing, so because it appeared a bit more with MCAS if brings out the lack of training.
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Old 03-20-2019, 10:16 AM
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Originally Posted by lazyboi1212 View Post
Look - People can say what they want but at the end of the day it's Boeing's fault. They either manufactured a plane with crappy flight systems, sensors, software etc... or they made the software and manuals too difficult for their customers to understand.

We often write simple software scripts at work. Before my team writes anything we meet with our intended users to understand their technical capabilities. If they just want to push a button that's what we do. If they want more flexibility we make sure they understand the logic behind the scrips and write simple manuals for them. We don't want them to bother us when it doesn't work. We want it to work for the customer.
I know this is an oversimplification. But it's Boeing fault either way, it's bad business to blame your customers. Don't give them that opportunity....
How do we know Boeing decided to use 1 AOA sensor arbitrarily? How do we know they decided not to alert the crew? I would imagine engineers and meetings, and teams dedicated to solving the issue presented to them when they came up with MCAS. There may be arguments against the logical dual sensors or warning that we have no clue about.
I wasn't there, I don't work for boeing.. but I can't believe aircraft automation engineers who's sole job it is to develop the MCAS system never said.... hey what happens if one of the AOA sensors fails?
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Old 03-20-2019, 10:54 AM
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Originally Posted by lazyboi1212 View Post
Look - People can say what they want but at the end of the day it's Boeing's fault. They either manufactured a plane with crappy flight systems, sensors, software etc... or they made the software and manuals too difficult for their customers to understand.

We often write simple software scripts at work. Before my team writes anything we meet with our intended users to understand their technical capabilities. If they just want to push a button that's what we do. If they want more flexibility we make sure they understand the logic behind the scrips and write simple manuals for them. We don't want them to bother us when it doesn't work. We want it to work for the customer.
I know this is an oversimplification. But it's Boeing fault either way, it's bad business to blame your customers. Don't give them that opportunity....
Complete BullSh!t.

The planes cannot fly themselves (yet) and need a trained, experienced crew to run them and correct maintenance to keep them flying. Proof of that was in the previous LionAir flight where they identified the issue on the previous flight - which landed fine - but then DIDN'T address the reported issue and sent the plane back in the air again!!

You could also blame Boeing, the airlines and the FAA for eliminating the Flight Engineers in the cockpit. Those guys were responsible for keeping an eye on all the airframes' systems and identifying if there was a problem with how they are operating., and help the pilot and copilot work around the issue.
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Old 03-20-2019, 11:37 AM
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While I recognize that the data is preliminary, when you get to the route of the issue, IMO, both of these incidents were avoidable...A debate can be had as to the blame, it's likely going to be a plane (systems) fighting with the flight crew over control. Tragically, whether you want to fault logged hours / training / experience / situational awareness / stress, they will all be contributing factors....Though, one has to ask themselves, why would, in 2019, with all the advancements in UI understanding and design, would you create a system to function without alerting the flight crew to it's control and function...Further, an audible / visual display of how to disable.... Perhaps I will be proven wrong, but until then, I believe these and any potential future incident with this aircraft is avoidable... One thought would be to rename the MCAS to the Auto Stall Avoidance System, or ASAS, so flight crew can get a triggered response to how the aircraft is responding....Blue Skies
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Old 03-20-2019, 02:24 PM
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Originally Posted by TurboJoe View Post
How do we know Boeing decided to use 1 AOA sensor arbitrarily? How do we know they decided not to alert the crew?
I too am curious about these questions. I have flown quite a few part 25 planes and while I don't know part 25 all that well, I was a little surprised when it is reported that there was one AOA.
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Old 03-20-2019, 03:24 PM
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Originally Posted by ndb8fxe View Post
I too am curious about these questions. I have flown quite a few part 25 planes and while I don't know part 25 all that well, I was a little surprised when it is reported that there was one AOA.
From a redundancy standpoint, 2 sensors is no better than 1, and perhaps actually worse. If you have 2 sensors providing redundant data, then you also have to decide what happens when the two redundant sensors don't agree. Presumably one sensor has gone bad, but how to determine which one? Whether you use only one sensor or two, it still requires the operator to intervene and if you have two, then it's an extra step for the operator to have to take to resolve which one is still good. The operator then also has to have a way to exclude the bad sensor. If you only have one, it's simple - the only one is the bad one and you shut it down. Once you get to three redundant sensors you can implement rules in the system to exclude data from the erroneous sensor without operator intervention (other than a warning to the operator).

Also a question for the commercial pilots on here. I'm just a lowly self-grounded SEL VFR pilot, so I don't know how this translates to the big twins and multis. Is it generally fair to assume (turbulence etc notwithstanding) that if you set power to something reasonable and maintain altitude and airspeed that AOA will take care of itself?
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Old 03-20-2019, 05:49 PM
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Originally Posted by SilverGraphite View Post
From a redundancy standpoint, 2 sensors is no better than 1, and perhaps actually worse. If you have 2 sensors providing redundant data, then you also have to decide what happens when the two redundant sensors don't agree. Presumably one sensor has gone bad, but how to determine which one? Whether you use only one sensor or two, it still requires the operator to intervene and if you have two, then it's an extra step for the operator to have to take to resolve which one is still good. The operator then also has to have a way to exclude the bad sensor. If you only have one, it's simple - the only one is the bad one and you shut it down. Once you get to three redundant sensors you can implement rules in the system to exclude data from the erroneous sensor without operator intervention (other than a warning to the operator).

Also a question for the commercial pilots on here. I'm just a lowly self-grounded SEL VFR pilot, so I don't know how this translates to the big twins and multis. Is it generally fair to assume (turbulence etc notwithstanding) that if you set power to something reasonable and maintain altitude and airspeed that AOA will take care of itself?
I have to disagree there. Redundant air data sensors are always better. I'm sure there are more than one pitot, static, and other redundant ADC sensors. Its not bad to have more than one, sure there might be a case where you have to interpret what you have and figure out which one failed, but it is better than having one fail and have 1 bogus indication.

In previous equipment I have flown, The pusher would not activate with only one AOA indicating. If there was a disagreement between the two AOA's the you were on you own for stall protection as far as the pusher is concerned. Actually the vane with the false high aoa, you would get the shaker on that side only, but no pusher. Big deal, how many times has an professional pilot had to rely on the pusher in order to avoid a stall? I will assume that it is a very rare event. Other than maybe a wind shear event If you fly through the shaker and get into the pusher you should probably be doing something else.

To me having two makes a lot of sense if you are going to get push from a false high AOA.

I know nothing about the max and don't know how similar this supposed event is to it, but it sure would suck to get the pusher unexpectedly at low altitude at normal climb speed especially with the AP on and hands off the yoke.

Last edited by ndb8fxe; 03-20-2019 at 05:55 PM.
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