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Boeing 737 MAX is stupidly designed

Old 03-19-2019, 02:09 PM
  #141  
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Good article on the 737 Max - https://www.zdnet.com/article/boeing...ly-do-so-much/
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Old 03-19-2019, 03:18 PM
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Originally Posted by CAP1 View Post
Good article if you're an Airbus employee. Other than that, just another opinion piece similar to ones propagated by the thread starter.
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Old 03-19-2019, 03:34 PM
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Originally Posted by CAP1 View Post

Quote from this article: " However, what this does reveal is that Boeing went to software as a patch for the modification to address performance flaws in a pre-existing systems architecture. It should have designed a completely new aircraft for this purpose."
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Old 03-19-2019, 05:06 PM
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Originally Posted by Kendall View Post
Quote from this article: " However, what this does reveal is that Boeing went to software as a patch for the modification to address performance flaws in a pre-existing systems architecture. It should have designed a completely new aircraft for this purpose."
A completely absurd article and associated quote.
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Old 03-19-2019, 05:14 PM
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Boeing did drop the ball with the software patch and will certain;y suffer in the courts. The real issue howe ever is this is basic flight 101, and the pilots dropped the ball more so. This, like most crashes could have been prevented, the software was just another link in the chain. All we can hope is to learn and not repeat.
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Old 03-19-2019, 06:10 PM
  #146  
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Originally Posted by LongIslandFisherman View Post
The cause for all this rather simple. Humans being human.

Agree. Most probably :
1. In cutting corners and costs to have a less than ideal design for business ($$$) reasons
2. In improper MCAS design triggered by only one sensor and software implementation
3. In inadequate pilot training.
4. In poor pilot response to emergency situations.
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Old 03-19-2019, 07:41 PM
  #147  
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Originally Posted by LongIslandFisherman View Post
The cause for all this rather simple. Humans being human.
Originally Posted by Kendall View Post
Agree. Most probably :
1. In cutting corners and costs to have a less than ideal design for business ($$$) reasons
2. In improper MCAS design triggered by only one sensor and software implementation
3. In inadequate pilot training.
4. In poor pilot response to emergency situations.
5. Pilots not using the available checklist and switches.
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Old 03-19-2019, 08:03 PM
  #148  
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Originally Posted by Kendall View Post
Agree. Most probably :
1. In cutting corners and costs to have a less than ideal design for business ($$$) reasons
2. In improper MCAS design triggered by only one sensor and software implementation
3. In inadequate pilot training.
4. In poor pilot response to emergency situations.

1. The MCAS is a logic thing built into the system. To me is seems (I am not an engineer but I do fly these so I know a lot of the logic) that the only real fault here is that it can be activated with a single sensor. When in my opinion it should need both AOA's and possible a speed sensor input to agree to trigger it. That's it. It won't be a "patch" like your iphone gets so much as changing a bit of logic in the way the system operates. That's it. They will change it to require two AOA's for activation and back in business. The reason it takes so long is because of the FAA and all the testing they will have to do. The "patch" was probably done last November.

Cost. Now it's costing them. BIG. Mainly because idiots that have no idea what they are talking about blowing something way out of proportion. The reality is some engineer made a mistake years ago about how this system should be triggered and now it has manifested itself. From the outset it would not have cost Boeing any more to change the logic in the system to what it will be now. So to say it is a cost saving measure (logic wise) is idiotic. If you wanna argue the point of engine placement and performance from a clean sheet design again idiotic. A clean sheet Boeing 787 has the same types of logic built into the flight control systems. These aircraft ARE NOT Cessna 172's. They operate in a wide envelope that REQUIRES stuff like this. Every single passenger jet you board has the same type of stuff no matter what. As I have posted and you can see the 737 since 1966 has had much logic built into the trim system. This was merely another layer and they screwed it up years ago in the design phase.

2. See above

3. Yes in 3rd world countries I agree.

4. Yes. As posted in the video and from the start following the proper checklist like the crew before them did would have saved the day. Below is a picture of a QRH for a 737. It is hard to tell but this book is about 2" thick. It covers all kinds of emergency scenarios for the 737. Every plane has one. In it are hundreds of emergencies from what to do if an engine catches on fire to what to do if the landing gear won't retract. This picture is of page 1. Page 1 is the page that list what Boeing feels are the most important emergencies that need to be dealt with immediately. Most all of these are "memory item checklists". Meaning you are supposed to have them committed to memory. Again out of hundreds of checklist these are the most important. Do you see "runaway stabilizer..... thats on page 9.1" on the list? Also a memory item checklist by the way? Yup.

So if lets say you had an engine catch on fire and the pilots flew around for 10 min and the wing melted off because they didn't follow this. In your opinion is it Boeings fault?

Now granted this system should not activate in the way it does. But if you don't follow the checklist you may create a huge problem for yourself. But even when they change it and it takes both AOA's. What if you have a dual AOA failure and MCAS activates? A lot less chance of that happening but entirely possible. Guess what it will be the same checklist and if you don't run it you will have the same problems. Think it won't happen? Notice there is a checklist for "loss of thrust on both engines" (dual engine failure). There is one for that. Ask Sully.

Point is you gotta follow established procedure.







Again if you want to be scared look into Airbus law. Below is a brief description of it. It governs how a COMPUTER runs an Airbus. As a pilot you are merely making suggestions. Ultimately it decides.

Airbus Flight Control Laws
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Old 03-19-2019, 08:16 PM
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Here is a tidbit out of the airbus law.

Notice it says "prevents pilot". Yup in an AIrbus 320 the pilot has no connection to the flight control surfaces that doesn't involve electrons flowing.

So what if the part that determines "load" (probably a g meter) malfunctions? In this case you switch law but what if some guy doesn't? I don't know...

Point is feel fortunate if you are flying on a 737 with a good flight crew. They will actually have a shot at flying it old school Wright Brothers style if they need to.



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Old 03-19-2019, 08:32 PM
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[QUOTE=ProppedUp;12352369]1. The MCAS is a logic thing built into the system. To me is seems (I am not an engineer but I do fly these so I know a lot of the logic) that the only real fault here is that it can be activated with a single sensor. When in my opinion it should need both AOA's and possible a speed sensor input to agree to trigger it. That's it. It won't be a "patch" like your iphone gets so much as changing a bit of logic in the way the system operates. That's it. They will change it to require two AOA's for activation and back in business. The reason it takes so long is because of the FAA and all the testing they will have to do. The "patch" was probably done last November.

Cost. Now it's costing them. BIG. Mainly because idiots that have no idea what they are talking about blowing something way out of proportion. The reality is some engineer made a mistake years ago about how this system should be triggered and now it has manifested itself. From the outset it would not have cost Boeing any more to change the logic in the system to what it will be now. So to say it is a cost saving measure (logic wise) is idiotic. If you wanna argue the point of engine placement and performance from a clean sheet design again idiotic. A clean sheet Boeing 787 has the same types of logic built into the flight control systems. These aircraft ARE NOT Cessna 172's. They operate in a wide envelope that REQUIRES stuff like this. Every single passenger jet you board has the same type of stuff no matter what. As I have posted and you can see the 737 since 1966 has had much logic built into the trim system. This was merely another layer and they screwed it up years ago in the design phase.
/QUOTE]


Thank you for giving such explanation and insight in this tragic situation fraught with human errors in design, execution, and performance which is invaluable given your expertise.

It seems to me that having MCAS engage without a definitive notification to the pilots whether it be a clear visual or audible or tactile (throttle shaking type) warning is another critical flaw and may have helped prevent the two disasters had a notification warning been put in place. As a pilot, I am interested to hear from your expert opinion your thoughts on an alteration providing such warning.
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Old 03-20-2019, 04:18 AM
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Originally Posted by Kendall View Post
Thank you for giving such explanation and insight in this tragic situation fraught with human errors in design, execution, and performance which is invaluable given your expertise.

It seems to me that having MCAS engage without a definitive notification to the pilots whether it be a clear visual or audible or tactile (throttle shaking type) warning is another critical flaw and may have helped prevent the two disasters had a notification warning been put in place. As a pilot, I am interested to hear from your expert opinion your thoughts on an alteration providing such warning.
Did you watch the video?? Did you look at the CFR data?? The stick shaker was going off like crazy telling them the plane "thinks" it's in a stall.

The priority is to figure out why it thinks it's in a stall so you can maintain speed and level flight... which means turning off automatic systems and getting the plane into a wings-level and attitude-level situation with adequate speed.
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Old 03-20-2019, 04:34 AM
  #152  
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[QUOTE=Kendall;12352406]
Originally Posted by ProppedUp View Post
1. The MCAS is a logic thing built into the system. To me is seems (I am not an engineer but I do fly these so I know a lot of the logic) that the only real fault here is that it can be activated with a single sensor. When in my opinion it should need both AOA's and possible a speed sensor input to agree to trigger it. That's it. It won't be a "patch" like your iphone gets so much as changing a bit of logic in the way the system operates. That's it. They will change it to require two AOA's for activation and back in business. The reason it takes so long is because of the FAA and all the testing they will have to do. The "patch" was probably done last November.

Cost. Now it's costing them. BIG. Mainly because idiots that have no idea what they are talking about blowing something way out of proportion. The reality is some engineer made a mistake years ago about how this system should be triggered and now it has manifested itself. From the outset it would not have cost Boeing any more to change the logic in the system to what it will be now. So to say it is a cost saving measure (logic wise) is idiotic. If you wanna argue the point of engine placement and performance from a clean sheet design again idiotic. A clean sheet Boeing 787 has the same types of logic built into the flight control systems. These aircraft ARE NOT Cessna 172's. They operate in a wide envelope that REQUIRES stuff like this. Every single passenger jet you board has the same type of stuff no matter what. As I have posted and you can see the 737 since 1966 has had much logic built into the trim system. This was merely another layer and they screwed it up years ago in the design phase.
/QUOTE]


Thank you for giving such explanation and insight in this tragic situation fraught with human errors in design, execution, and performance which is invaluable given your expertise.

It seems to me that having MCAS engage without a definitive notification to the pilots whether it be a clear visual or audible or tactile (throttle shaking type) warning is another critical flaw and may have helped prevent the two disasters had a notification warning been put in place. As a pilot, I am interested to hear from your expert opinion your thoughts on an alteration providing such warning.
If every part of the airplanes logic told us what it were doing every sec we would have information overload.

For example the speed trim system or mach trim system doesn't tell me when it is functioning it just does.

Secondly it doesn't need to. MCAS failure in this case causes a runaway trim incident. They had a runaway trim incident. As I have posted before following checklist would have fixed it.

I do not need an engine fire warning light for

"engine fire for a fuel leak"

"engine fire because of and oil leak"

"engine fire because of a hydraulic leak"

nor do I need a checklist for

"engine fire checklist for a fuel leak"

"engine fire checklist because of and oil leak"

"engine fire checklist because of a hydraulic leak"

It's to much. If I have a fire I have a fire doesn't matter what for so much. Follow checklist and put it out.

I don't need a warning light for runaway trim for because of MCAS because guess what the checklist would be EXACTLY the same as the runaway trim checklist.

If I have a runaway trim for ANY reason follow procedures and checklist and TURN IT OFF.

To put it in perspective Lion Air fought this runaway trim for over 6 minutes. 6 minutes. That is a lloooonnnnggggg time when things are going wrong. At some point you gotta ask yourself why does this thing keep doing this that I don't want it to do and TURN IT OFF anyway because it's pissing you off....... Not because your supposed to in a checklist or Boeing says to. Just because it's pissing you off...........

If your driving around in your car and your radio goes to max volume. You try to turn it down. It turns down.

10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.

10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.

10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.

10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.


10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.
10 sec later it goes back to full volume. You turn it down.

Pop quiz. At some point do you just turn it off?

If you answer yes you "may" be smart enough to fly an airplane.

If you answer no you shouldn't be allowed to fly on an airplane.... As a passenger.....

I think I have said all I can here.

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Old 03-20-2019, 04:46 AM
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For Proppedup or any other pilots... I'm still curious about the one stick shaker being active. Is that a common occurrence (if you get near a stall condition) or do both sticks tend to shake when that happens?? Other than being in a hard bank when nearing a stall condition, is there any other time (other than maybe icing) when one side of the plane will stall??
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Old 03-20-2019, 04:51 AM
  #154  
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Propped Up, Thank you for your explanation. Clearly these pilots were not well trained and may not have even known about the existence of the MCAS, but surely they did not know it was engaged. And if they did not know it was engaged or kept engaging, they surely did not know they needed to pull the circuit breakers which may likely have averted disaster. Or is this oversimplifying it?
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Old 03-20-2019, 05:13 AM
  #155  
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Here is an interesting take on it - Prison. NOW in [Market-Ticker]
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Old 03-20-2019, 05:40 AM
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Originally Posted by bellsisland View Post
Here is an interesting take on it - Prison. NOW in [Market-Ticker]
Another absurd article.

What I'd like to know.... on how many of the ~20,000 successful flights did the flight crew have to disable the MCAS system?
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Old 03-20-2019, 05:57 AM
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Those who know more than I do on pilot training and airlines safety please school me if my next statement is wrong.

I wouldnít feel comfortable flying on any airline except for US based major carriers....United, Delta, American, SouthWest, JetBlue. Iíd even include Spirit and Frontier.

The idea of getting on some of these airlines based out of Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia is truly terrifying to me. My perception is the pilots in these foreign countries are not as well trained as American pilots.

I have nothing to back this up, I guess itís really just my own preconceived notionís. Maybe Iím totally wrong on this and if I am please correct me.
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Old 03-20-2019, 06:00 AM
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Originally Posted by Hooper View Post
Those who know more than I do on pilot training and airlines safety please school me if my next statement is wrong.

I wouldnít feel comfortable flying on any airline except for US based major carriers....United, Delta, American, SouthWest, JetBlue. Iíd even include Spirit and Frontier.

The idea of getting on some of these airlines based out of Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia is truly terrifying to me. My perception is the pilots in these foreign countries are not as well trained as American pilots.

I have nothing to back this up, I guess itís really just my own preconceived notionís. Maybe Iím totally wrong on this and if I am please correct me.
Looks more and more like a training issue.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/pilot-hit...053511780.html
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Old 03-20-2019, 06:07 AM
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Originally Posted by ProppedUp View Post
Here is a tidbit out of the airbus law.

Notice it says "prevents pilot". Yup in an AIrbus 320 the pilot has no connection to the flight control surfaces that doesn't involve electrons flowing.

So what if the part that determines "load" (probably a g meter) malfunctions? In this case you switch law but what if some guy doesn't? I don't know...

Point is feel fortunate if you are flying on a 737 with a good flight crew. They will actually have a shot at flying it old school Wright Brothers style if they need to.


I was staying out of this. Your stretching things a bit.

I fly an Airbus currently, and have flown multiple Boeingís, McDonnel Douglas, and Falcon acft.

If you turn the autopilot off in the Airbus, you fly it, just like anything else. Are the control surfaces operated by fly-by-wire?
You bet. So are fighters, SO ARE BOEINGS (777 and 787), so are Gulfstreams and Falcons. Fly-by-wire is nothing new.
Airbus has never lost an aircraft due to loss of flight controls.
Fly by wire is a very reliable system and design.
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Old 03-20-2019, 06:53 AM
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Originally Posted by Kendall View Post
Propped Up, Thank you for your explanation. Clearly these pilots were not well trained and may not have even known about the existence of the MCAS, but surely they did not know it was engaged. And if they did not know it was engaged or kept engaging, they surely did not know they needed to pull the circuit breakers which may likely have averted disaster. Or is this oversimplifying it?

Ok last time. I will do this real slow for you and give you the answers.

When MCAS engages what does it do Kendall?

Answer: runs the trim nose down (to help with stall recovery)

What does it do again Kendall?

Answer: runs nose down trim right? We have concluded this. You agree.



So now lets say your a pilot on one of these big ole shiny jets.

And your big ole shiny jet for no apparent reason to you decides to run the trim nose down. It doesn't even have the common decency to warn you. It just does it. What would you do assuming you were flying?

Answer: First time maybe you trim it up. Right? Ok we do that.

A few seconds later this airplane decides it wants nose down trim... Again... All on it's own. You think well WTF is going on here? This ain't right......

Maybe you try again and trim it nose up.

Then it does it again.

Well how many times doing this evolution would it take you to realize you have a problem Kendall?

5 times? 10? Maybe 20 if your a bit slow. Hopefully just a couple but at some point you will realize you have a problem with the trim system.

Now lets make a big stretch here and assume you are a fully qualified 737 captain you will say hey!!! We not only have a checklist for this situation but one I have committed to memory.

And even better thoughtful Mr. Boeing put two little switches right here so that if and when I have this problem I can shut it off.

It doesn't matter if it's doing it because the MCAS is telling it to. It doesn't matter if it's doing it because the speed trim system is telling it to.

It doesn't matter if it's doing it because Santa Claus didn't bring it what it wanted for Christmas. It doesn't matter if it's doing it because it's too cold. It doesn't matter if it's doing it because it's hot. It doesn't matter if it's doing it because it's raining. It doesn't matter if it's doing it because snowing. It doesn't matter if it's doing it because it had a bad sensor tells it to.

The fact is you have a trim system doing something you don't want it to Kendall.

This is called runaway trim...... It's not new....

So after all this what have we learned that Mr. Boeing says to do when we have a runaway trim system?

I'll give you a hint.

The first thing you do is your memory item checklist for "runaway stabilizer".

But assuming you forgot that you pick up the book from post from post 148 and Mr. Boeing thought that this checklist was so important he put where to find it right on the cover. It tells you where to look right on the front. You don't even have to flip through any pages Kendall to the index. It's that easy. Right in your face..... Just pick it up and open your eyes....

It says tab 9 page 1. So we go there.

Then as you can see from post 114 it tells you exactly what to do.

What does it say to do Kendall?


If you haven't or can't figure this out never take flying lessons.


Here is another thing to relate it to boats.

If you were driving around on your boat and all of the sudden one of your trim tabs went full down causing the boat to lurch to one side.

You press the appropriate button and correct it.

It does it again.

You correct it again.

What do you do?

Well anyone with a half a brain would say ok lets correct it and pull the dang breaker real quick so it stops and we can continue home.

Doesn't matter why it did it. Maybe a switch is bad, maybe the circuit board is bad but it's doing it. We don't like it. It doesn't work well in this condition so lets shut it off put it where we want it and turn it off.


In a 737 we have not only a circuit breaker to turn it off but you should never get that far because they gave us disconnect switches right there on the pedestal to turn it off. And even when it's off we have a big ole wheel so we can manually adjust it and we have a checklist that tells us how to do it all......

WTF else do you want Kendall????

Yes Boeing needs to change the logic.

But pilots gotta do what they are supposed to also......
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Last edited by ProppedUp; 03-20-2019 at 06:59 AM.
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