Shortsighted Proposal to Break up the Coast Guard, if Implemented, will not Serve the Greater Good
An informal proposal to split up the United States Coast Guard into two or more separately functioning bodies is being thrown around on Capitol Hill. A recent article by TradeWinds has alleged that the formulation of a brand new federal agency could be in the works. The new agency would handle non-security (regulatory/oversight) aspects of the Coast Guard’s current mission package, leaving the US Coast Guard itself to concentrate on homeland security and general patrolling of the 95,000 miles of U.S. coastlines. It is probably no coincidence that the move to change the composition of the Coast Guard comes at a particularly bad time for this embattled, multi-missioned force. But Washington insiders say that that the Bush administration has been kicking the tires on this one since as early as November of 2005. And, while no doubt rooted in the desire to increase the efficiency of all of the Coast Guard’s many functions, it is also a decidedly bad idea.
More than one commercial, merchant marine-oriented outfit or trade organization is likely to have a beef with the Coast Guard at one time or another. The same can be said to be true for the mariners who crew the vessels that ply the oceans. Certainly, it is a natural reaction of those whose activities fall under the regulatory yoke to chafe against those restraints. In the wake of 9/11, the increased security mission for the Coast Guard has led many to believe that other functions such as port state control (PSC), ship documentation and registration, mariner licensing and documentation have fallen into neglect and become second-tier priorities. The extent to which this might be true is a matter for debate. Using the thinly-veiled shadow of the Deepwater failures, however, to advance the concept of splitting up the Coast Guard is not the way to go about it.
In the 1980s, Wall Street’s idea of creating value was to take large, monolith corporations and break them up, selling the parts for more than the whole and making a ton of money in the process. And as little as ten years ago, no one in his or her right mind would have suggested that this concept could have been applied to the separation of the many duties under the domain of the Coast Guard. In the mid-1990s, the Coast Guard was famous for doing more with less, and executing a myriad of tasks better than anyone else could possibly imagine doing even a fraction of its workload. Its response to and performance during 9/11 and Katrina, among a multitude of other crises in between, has been enviable. Indeed, the routine, operational execution of the Coast Guard’s primary functions has rarely been a problem. Sadly, the same cannot be said about the management of its own business affairs.
The event known as 9/11 brought the Coast Guard out of the second tier of funding priorities and ultimately, into a seat at the grownup’s table in Washington. And although it finally had the funding to do the things it could have only dreamed of in the past, the increased fiduciary mandate was not handled well. And Deepwater is probably only the tip of the iceberg. None of this, however, changes the inherent economy of scale presented by the Coast Guard’s makeup. From one oceangoing platform patrolling 200 miles off of our domestic coastlines, the American taxpayer gets the benefit of (a.) law enforcement, (b.) drug interdiction, (c.) immigration controls, (d.) fisheries oversight and (e.) the homeland security blanket that can only be provided by pushing out our borders to meet the oncoming threats from multiple sources. Shoreside, the cumulative experience of more than 200 years of regulatory experience keeps the overwhelming majority of the consumer goods consumed by this country flowing smoothly, in a relatively efficient manner and in the face of a security environment that would grind commerce in lesser places to a standstill.
Married together, the many functions of the Coast Guard provide excellent value for the American consumer and the maritime entities which fall under this domain. And if, as it is portrayed in the recent TradeWinds article, the soon-to-be-unveiled proposals have a good chance of passing during the present session of Congress, we may very soon see the folly of splitting these functions into compartmentalized units. But, where there is smoke, there is often fire. A Coast Guard spokesperson in Washington would not comment on the matter -- as is official policy at USCG headquarters, but unofficially, the fifth branch of United States uniformed service is dead set against the idea. Another Coast Guard official in Washington also told MarEx, “Of course, we have to listen and respond to our customers and we will continue to do so. Marine safety is still a primary focus of this organization.” Others in a position to know would not officially comment, either. And the U.S. Maritime Administration has indicated that at least one USCG function having to do with the alteration of bridges may be shifted into MARAD’s domain. Additionally, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) already has a heavy hand in investigating significant marine accidents. This task was something that, in the past, had been exclusively the domain of the Coast Guard.
Former MARAD Administrator John Jamian told MarEx on Wednesday that the idea is not necessarily a new one, but it would represent “a formidable challenge” to get done. Beyond this, he said, “I am not necessarily an advocate for splitting up the Coast Guard, but if it were to happen, then I think that MARAD would be an appropriate place to take certain pieces of their current duties.” He pointed to the DOT’s current oversight of airline pilot and railroad licensing as a good analogy of parallel duties and also said that MARAD is an able vessel fleet manager already. Hence, duties such as maintaining aids to navigation and other waterborne activities could probably be picked up in a fairly seamless manner. He scoffed at those who would hesitate to place new regulatory responsibilities under the domain of MARAD simply because it is a “promotional” organization. Instead, he says, “MARAD has the assets and people to get a lot of these things done. It’s a shame they don’t get tasked with more.”
Life-altering events have a habit of being the catalyst for legislative initiatives in Washington. The formulation of the Department of Homeland Security is the most visible product of the attacks of September 11 and long before that, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was spurred by the Exxon Valdez disaster. For better or for worse, both changes are now firmly part of the political and regulatory landscape in America. The failure(s) of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater recapitalization program and a change in congressional leadership may well be the perfect storm which has brought legislators to the point where they may be considering the dismantling of the Coast Guard as we know it. And, these are decidedly bad reasons to do so.
The only good reason to consider this draconian action would be to move the Coast Guard’s regulatory functions back into the Department of Transportation where they were domiciled for so many years. There’s certainly no evidence that this shifting of responsibilities would produce a better maritime regulatory branch. Without a doubt, it would be far more expensive. The Coast Guard today is in the capable hands of ADM Thad Allen. And if he can only re-engineer the business side of the equation, the rest of it will take care of itself. But now is not the time to be messing with the main engine of the most agile, versatile -- and believe it or not -- most cost-effective vehicle at our disposal.
Joseph Keefe is the Managing Editor of The Maritime Executive. He can be reached at
jkeefe@maritime-executive.com.
http://www.newsletterscience.com/mar...264&l=1&s=3862 
Proposal to break up the USCG.......Long C&P 
